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A Tax Shelter for Students: Yale's
Tuition Postponement Option
During the 1971-72 academic year, Yale University introduced a
new student loan program, the Tuition Postponement Option (TPO).l
Under the plan, students borrow from the university, with repayments
made at a percentage of their future incomes for up to thirty-five
years. Depending on his income level during the repayment period,
a student may repay more or less than he would under a conventional
loan taken at commercial interest rates.
Similar programs, hereafter referred to as contingent repayment
plans, have been previously proposed, usually with the federal govern-
ment making loans directly to students on a national scale.2 The
1. Approval of the plan was announced on February 5, 1971. Yale Daily News, Feb.
5, 1971, at 1, col. 1 (extra ed.). N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1971, at 26, col. 1. For a detailed
description of the plan as initially announced, see Yale University, Yale Tuition Post.
ponement Option, Feb. 6, 1971 (Background Detail for Release Morning Papers). This
statement is reprinted in full in Yale Daily News, supra, at 2, col. 1, and in Hearings
on the Education Amendments of 1971 Before the Subcommittee on Education of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess,, pt. 5, at 8014
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Education Hearings].
2. The first proposal for such loans was apparently made by Milton Friedman. He
proposed a government loan program with payments to be a fixed percentage of income
above a given base. Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, i ECONOnItcs
AND THlE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 140 (R. Solo ed. 1955). A slightly revised version of this
paper appears in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 105 (1962).
A major boost for the concept came from a 1967 Office of Education study which
recommended that the federal government set up an Educational Opportunity Bank
to make student loans on similar principles. Repayments would be a fixed percentage
of income, with no borrower paying more than under a conventional federal student
loan. PANEL ON EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNrIY BANK 1-2, 11-12(1967) [hereinafter cited as ZACHARIAS REPORT]. The report is reprinted in full in Hearings
on the Higher Education Amendments of 1970 before the Subcommittee on Education
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 315.37
(1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Education Hearings].
In December 1968 the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education recommended a
similar federal loan plan and called for further study of its details. The plan (except
for administration) would be self-sustaining, with interest based on federal borrowing
costs. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, QUALITY AND EQUALITY: NEW LEvELS
OF FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 27-29 (1968). However, the following
month, an HEW Report to the President recommended against such a loan plan largely
because a heavy federal subsidy would have been required in the "almost guaranteed"
event that borrowers would be predominantly students who would have low future
earnings. U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, TOWARD A LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR FEDERAL FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 24 & n.3, 65 (1969), reprinted in 1970 Education Hearings,
supra, pt. 1, at 357-437 [hereinafter cited as RINLIN REPORT] [page citations are to
1970 Education Hearings]. Instead, the Report proposed fixed-interest loans with no
federal subsidy, and a repayment schedule (payments possibly increasing over time)
fixed in advance. A very limited cancellation feature for borrowers with low Incomes
would allow forgiveness of up to ten per cent of the payments due in any given year.
Id. at 398-99, 433-4. The Carnegie Commission then retreated from its earlier position
and recommended a loan plan similar to that proposed in the RIVLIN REroRT combined
with grants to needy students. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, QUALITY
AND EQUALITY: REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS-NEW LEVELS OF FEDERAL REs'ONsIBILITY FOR
HIGHER EDUCATION 68-69 (1970). The relevant section of this report is printed in 1970
Education Hearings, supra, pt. 3, at 1618-23.
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major stated purpose of such a national deferred tuition plan has been
to widen access to higher education for students from low-income
families by increasing their willingness to borrow?3
Present methods of promoting equality of educational opportunity
have not been effective.4 Educational institutions are in financial crisiss
and cannot increase conventional forms of aid to meet rapidly increas-
ing costs of attendance. 6 The federal response thus far has also been
In 1970 a detailed proposal for a plan very similar to TPO mas made by Robert
Carlsson. Payments would be a fixed percentage of income above a base level (TPO
differs in not having a base level), with a maximum payment for borrowers with very
high incomes. The percentage would be set so that the plan would break even. Howeser,
the break-even point would be based upon a subsidized interest rate, so borrowers with
high incomes would not be significantly worse off than under a commercial loan.
Carlsson, A Federal Program of Student Loans, 29 Am. J. oF EcoN. & SoCIoLOGY 263
(1970).
It was against this background that the Yale TPO Plan was announced. For a com-
prehensive bibliography of books and articles on deferred tuition, see Yale University
Tuition Postponement Option Office, Contingent Repayment Loans: Bibliography, Nov.
19, 1971 (mimeo.). For other plans currently being impiemented, see note 81 infra.
3. See, e.g., ZACHARIAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; C.L'EGIE CosNtSsioN. oN Himrtt
EDUCATION, QUALITY AND EQUALITY: NEW LEVELS OF FEDERAL RESPONsirLiTY Fort HiIw t
EDUCATION 28 (1968). Dr. Rivlin believes equality of opportunity should be the goal of
any federal aid policy. 1970 Education Hearings, supra note 2, Pt. 1, at 347.
4. Only 20 per cent of the 1967 high school graduates from families with incomes
under $3000 entered college. For those with family incomes in the range $10,000.15,000,
60 per cent entered college. For family incomes over $15,000, 95 per cent entered college.
1970 Education Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 1, at 540.
Even after adjustments for ability, the differences remain large. See generally Berls,
Higher Education Opportunity and Achievement in the United States, in JOINT Eco-
NOMIC CoMMITTEE, THE ECONOMIes AND FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TilE UNrrW
STATES: A COMPENDIUMs OF PAPERS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (Comm. Print 1969) [here-
inafter cited as Ecoxomcxcs COMPENDIUM]. For example, of 1965 high school graduates in
the second ability quintile 84 per cent of those in the top socioeconomic quartile, as
opposed to only 36 per cent of those in the bottom socioeconomic quartile, entered
college within 5 years. Id. at 147, 150. If all students of an) given ability quintile
entered college in the same proportion as do those students with the same ability but
from the top socioeconomic quartile, an additional 600,000 students from each high
school graduating class would eventually enter college. Id. at 151, 196.
5. See E. CHEIT, THE NEW DEPRESSION IN HIGHER EmucrmoN (1971). In this stud)
for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the Ford Foundation, Cheiit
studied forty-one representative public and private institutions of higher education.
Extrapolating his data to a national scale, the Carnegie Commission staff concluded
that 39 per cent of all institutions, representing 22 per cent of all students arc "not in
financial trouble"; 42 per cent of all institutions, representing 54 per cent of all stu-
dents, are "headed for financial trouble"; and 19 per cent of all institutions representing
24 per cent of all students, are "in financial trouble." Id. at x.
See also Jellema, The Red and the Black, in Hearings on the Higher Education
Amendments of 1971 Before the Special Subcoinm. oil Education of the House Conmittee
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 151 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
1971 Amendment Hearings].
6. For the decade ending in 1967-68, the average annual increase in tuition and
required fees was 7.5 per cent for private institutions and 5.8 per cent for public ones.
Cnarr, supra note 5, at 13. In 1971-72, tuition, room and board at public institutions
averaged $1248; for all private institutions, 2722; for private universities alone, S3168.
1971 Education Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 609. The poor financial condition of
institutions is due in part to the large and increasing expenditures on student financial
aid. 1971 Amendment Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 147. Many administrators at
private institutions fear that their schools will soon be populated exclusively by the
very rich and the very poor on fall scholarships. See, e.g., id. at 148, Ci r, supra note
5, at 13; N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1972, at 49, col. 6.
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inadequate.7 In fact, a major reason for federal reluctance to institute
a contingent repayment plan has been an unwillingness to absorb
large losses in the event that only students with low future incomes
borrow under the program.8
A contingent repayment plan, however, need not be subsidized.0
7. Roughly one million of the 2!4 million students from families with incomes under
$10,000 are not receiving federal education assistance. 1971 Amendment Hearings, supra
note 5, pt. 1, at 269 (testimony of Dr. Muirhead). Lack of finances is the dominant
reason for the failure to attend college, according to the Office of Education. Id. at 259.
Recognition of the general problem is what led the Nixon administration to press for
the enactment of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318 (June 23, 1972).
See generally 1971 Amendment Hearings, supra note 5. The Act authorizes all esthnated
$800 million to $1 billion annually for institutional grants, all estimated 850 million
annually for grants to needy students, and $40 million for colleges in grave financial
difficulty. Chronicle of Higher Education, May 22, 1972, at 2, col. 1. Actual spending is
likely to be considerably less, however. For example, institutional aid is likely to total
less than $100,000,000. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1972, at 45, col. 7.
Federal loan programs-are the major concern of this Note. The most significant of
these is the Federal Guaranteed Loan Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-87 (1970) which was
amended by the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318 (June 23, 1972),
The government insures or reinsures the principal and interest on loans made by
states or institutions to individual students. Students can borrow, usually from a local
bank, tip to $2500 per year to an undergraduate maximum of $7500. The loans must
be repaid within ten years, and payments each year must total $360. The student can
be charged no more than seven per cent interest on the unpaid principal balance, but the
government will pay the lender an additional amount of up to three per cent, The loans
are further subsidized for students from families with adjusted income levels below
$15,000, and students from families with higher incomes, who obtain certificates of need
from their colleges. These students are charged no interest until they begin repayments
following graduation, the government paying the lender the full interest cost for the
interim period.
Over $1 billion in guaranteed loans were made in the first eight months of fiscal 1972.
Cole, Personal Finance: Students' Defaults, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1972, at 55, cot. 2.
The Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 137 (June 23, 1972), also
establishes direct federal loans to students to replace the similar National Defense Edu-
cation Act (NDEA) loans. Institutions receive funds from the federal government to
make loans to needy students, the institution itself being required to put tip one.ninth
of the federal contribution. Undergraduates are eligible for up to $5000 in such loans.
Repayments begin following graduation, and require a minimum annual payment of
$360 and a maximum term of ten years. No interest is charged until repayments begin,
and then the interest is only three per cent. Portions of the loans are forgiven for
borrowers who later enter certain teaching and military positions.
A total of $369 million of NDEA loans were available in 1970.71. 1971 Education
Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 588.
Other provisions of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92.318 (June 23,
1972), though not directly relevant for purposes of this Note, are clearly of major
significance. For example, § 131 of the Act authorizes Basic Educational Opportunity
Grants to each college student of up to $1400, less the expected family contribution,
but no more than 60 per cent of his total education cost for the year.
8. This was the reason the RIVLIN REtORT opposed any plan in which total payments
would significantly depend on income. See note 2 supra.
9. The presence of a subsidy makes it possible to allow borrowers who will have
below average incomes to pay less, without requiring borrowers who will have above
average incomes to pay more than they would under a conventional loan. A partially
subsidized plan would use a repayment rate set so that borrowers with high incomes
would pay penalties less on the whole than the cost to the lender of forgiving payments
by borrowers with low incomes. The same result could occur inadvertently it the av.
erage income of borrowers was below the predicted incomes from which the repayment
rate was derived.
Any plan designed to "break even" at an interest rate below the market rate is, In
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The Yale system is designed to be self-supporting. The repayment
rate is set at a level that compels high-income borrowers to pay a
penalty equal to any payments forgiven to low-income borrowers.10
Borrowers having high incomes will therefore pay more than they
would have under a conventional loan. Of the several plans that are
now in effect or will shortly be initiated," the Yale Plan provides
the only test of whether a self-supporting contingent repayment plan
can succeed despite this penalty on those who will have high incomes.12
The Internal Revenue Service has recently ruled that all payments
made by Yale TPO borrowers in excess of the principal amount bor-
rowed, including the penalty paid for having a high income, will be
deductible as interest for federal income tax purposes.13 The effect of
this Ruling is to make TPO more attractive to those anticipating a
high income, as the tax saving from this deduction will offset a sub-
stantial portion of the high-income penalty.14
Following a description of the TPO Plan and the Revenue Ruling,
this Note will argue that the penalty should not be deductible as
interest. Moreover, viewing this interest deduction as a subsidy to
TPO borrowers,' 5 there is no reason to believe that it is any more
efficient than alternative TPO subsidies in promoting equal educa-
tional opportunity. Finally, it will be suggested that the grant of this
fact, subsidized, since the public or private lender incurs an opportunity cost by lending
money under the plan. Of the proposals in note 2 supra, the only self.supporting plans
were the original Friedman proposal and the later modified 1986 Carnegie Commitssion
proposal.
10. The terms "high-income" and "low-income" refer to borrowers .vhosc futtdre
incomes are, respectively, above and below average relative to all borrowers tinder
the plan.
11. Duke University instituted a contingent repayment plan at the same time as
Yale; Harvard University is instituting a plan this year. A New York State plan begins
in 1973-74. See note 81 infra.
12. The Yale plan is admittedly experimental. Yale Daily News, supra note 1, at 1,
col. 1. N.Y. Times, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1.
Some 50 to 60 per cent of the undergraduates were initially expected to borrow under
the plan. Id. Actual figures were somewhat lower.
Of Yale undergraduates, 25 per cent borrowed under the plan during 1971-72, the
figures ranging from 35 per cent of the freshmen to 19 per cent of the seniors. The
maximum allowed sum of $800 was taken by 69 per cent of the borrowers, 58 per cent
of the freshmen to 84 per cent of the seniors. Women borrowed at a slightly lowver rate
than men. Yale University, 1971-72 Participation Analysis: Yale College. Mar. 22, 1972
(mimeo.).
13. Rev. Rul. 72-2, 1972 INr. REv. BULL. No. 2, at 11.
14. See note 83 infra.
15. See generally Surrey, Tax Incentives versus Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HIv. L. REv. 705 (1970).
The interest deduction on the principal amount of the original loan is a subsidy for
loans rather than for education. The present discussion concerns only the extra de-
duction granted to high-income borrowers, which is more directly a subsidy for edit-
cation. In theory the principle of contingent repayment borrowing could be used for
any large-scale borrowing based on future income, but none aside from education loans
has yet been proposed.
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questionable interest deduction may in fact hinder desirable experi-
mentation in identifying the most effective use of government funds
in support of a contingent repayment system.
I. The TPO Contract
Under the Yale TPO, the university enters into a separate contract10
with each student borrower in which the borrower agrees to pay to
the university, for each $100 borrowed, 17 an amount equal to .04 per
cent of his or her' s adjusted gross income' 0 (subject to a minimum
payment)20 for a period of up to thirty-five years. 2' The repayment
period normally begins the year following graduation. 2
All borrowers whose repayment periods begin in any given year
form a Repayment Group.23 An account called the Group Termina-
tion Account is maintained by the university for each Repayment
16. The document described is the Yale University 1971-72 Tuition Postponement
Option Plan: Yale College, July 1, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Contract]. Explanationg
in the text may go beyond the literal wording of the section(s) cited. Graduate and
professional students are covered under separate documents with identical section nuln.
bering and only necessary minor changes.
17. The 1970-71 Yale College combined fee for undergraduate tuition, room, and
board was $3900. Undergraduates could borrow under TPO, in any year, a mtaxinunm
of $300 plus the amount by which fees in that year exceeded those in 1970-71. Givei
a projected $300 annual increase in fees (5500 the first year), a freshman entering In the
fall of 1971 could borrow a maximum of approximately $5000 during his four years.
Yale Daily News, supra note 1, at 2, col. 1.
In any year a student elects to borrow under the plan, he must borrow at least $00,
and he may borrow any amount (in increments of $50) up to the maximnun for that
year. Unused borrowing in one year does not increase the maximum an individual may
borrow in subsequent years. Id. and Contract § 4.01. A further limitation is that the
amount borrowed must be used to defray educational expenses. Contract § 4.01. Gradti.
ate students can borrow as much as $2400 per year. Yale University, General Bulletht
and Weekly Calendar, Mar. 10, 1972, at 2, col. 1.
18. The plan is completely sex-neutral. A borrower who files an individual Income
tax return pays the .04 per cent rate solely on his or her own reported income, re-
gardless of marital status. If a borrower marries and files a joint return, however, he
or she pays on the greater of (1) half the joint income, or (2) the income that would
have been reported on an individual return. Contract § 6.01(b).
19. The income tax definition is used. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954 § 62. If a borrower Is
not obligated to file a tax return, the repayment amount is computed as if one were
filed. Furthermore, if the Code is amended so that the amended definition of adjusted
gross income is "substantially different" from the 1971 definition, the 1971 definition
applies. Contract §§ 6.01(a)(l)-(3).
20. See p. 1397 infra.
21. Contract §§ 6.02(b), 7.01, 7.03. The .04 per Cent figure has no relation to all
interest rate; rather it determines the amount in dollars that is paid in a given year.
The rate comes to $4 per $1000 of income per $1000 borrowed. For example, a borrower
of $3500 who in a given year has an income of $20,000 will owe $;280 (54 times 3.6
times 20) the following year.
22. The payment term begins in the year following the first calendar year at the
end of which the borrower is 21 years old and is no longer a candidate for any academic
degree. Thus any degree program at any institution delays the start of the repayment
period. However, Yale may nevertheless require payments to begin if the borrower
has been a candidate for ten or more academic years. Contract § 7.02.
23. Contract § 8.01(a).
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Group. At formation of the Group, its balance is the total amount
borrowed by all members of the Group, plus accumulated interest
at a Contract Interest Rate (CIR).24 Each year during the repayment
period, the balance is increased by the amount of interest at the CIR
and decreased by the total amount paid by members of the GroupY5
Group Termination occurs if the balance of the Group Termination
Account reaches zero within thirty-five years. At that time, all bor-
rowers in the Repayment Group who have repaid the principal amount
borrowed are relieved of all further obligation.20 But each borrower
has a minimum personal obligation to repay the principal amount
borrowed, without interest; this obligation survives Group Termina-
tion.27 A required minimum annual payment of $2.90 per $100 bor-
rowed 28 ensures that the principal will be repaid within the thirty-five
year period. In no event does a borrower pay for more than thirty-
five years.2 9
There are two circumstances in which a borrower may stop making
payments before Group Termination. The first is the borrower's
death. Any principal still outstanding is paid by a life insurance policy
carried by the university on the lives of all borrowers.30 The other
circumstance which ends all obligation is Early Termination. This
occurs when the borrower has himself repaid at the CIR, 150 per cent
of the principal borrowed.31 Early Termination may be achieved
through the normal course of payments by borrowers with high in-
comes,32 or by any borrower through making a "buy-out" payment
at any time.33
The CIR itself is not a fixed rate, but rather one calculated peri-
odically by the university to reflect its cost of financing and admin-
24. See pp. 1397-98.
25. Contract § 10.02.
26. Id. § 11.03-.04.
27. If less than the principal amount has been paid at Group Termination, the
remainder must be paid in equal annual installments ending in the thirty.fifth year.
Interest at the CIR which was in effect for the year of Group Termination must be
paid on the balance, but only from the time of Group Termination. Id. § 11.05.
28. Id. § 6.02(a). A borrower with an income below $7250 thus pays the minimum
amount rather than the percentage rate.
29. Id. § 7.03.
30. Id. § 13.02. Insurance proceeds are treated as payments by the borrower and
when paid reduce the balance in the Group Termination Account. Id. &R 10.02. 13.05.
31. An Early Termination Account is maintained for each borrower, with an initial
balance of 150 per cent of the amount borrowed. The Account balance increases at
the CIR, and is reduced by payments made by the borrower. The balance is thus at
all times the amount necessary to pay off 150 per cent of the amount borrowed at the
CIR. Early Termination occurs when the balance becomes zero. Contract ,R 10.03, 11.02.
32. Borrowers with incomes of at least 50 per cent above the average for their Group
will reach this maximum level by making the required annual payments. See note 53
infra.
33. Contract § 6.06. See note 31 supra.
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istering the plan. The university borrows (by means of short-term
commercial notes) an amount equal to the outstanding debt of all
student borrowers (including prior years' interest).84 Semi-annually
the university determines the average interest rate it is paying on
these notes and adds a service charge (not to exceed 1 per cent) to
cover the cost of administering the plan.33 The resulting CIR3 0 is
used to compute the new balance in the Group Termination account
and the amount each borrower must pay to achieve Early Termination.
II. The Revenue Ruling
When Yale first announced the TPO Plan, it was noted that all
loan repayments beyond the principal amount would probably be
deductible as interest for federal income tax purposes.37 The univer-
sity subsequently requested a ruling from the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) and received a letter confirming this tax treatment.38
Shortly thereafter the letter was formally published by the IRS as a
Revenue Ruling.39
The Ruling has five major sections. It holds, first, that participants
will not realize taxable income from the initial tuition deferral, since
"the participant has an unconditional and legally enforceable obliga.
tion to make certain payments to the university."40 Second, it accepts
the proposed allocation of a borrower's payments to his principal until
paid and the remainder to interest. 41 Third, the Ruling holds that
payments allocated to principal or to life insurance premiums are
not deductible.42
34. Tobin & Pugash, The Economics of the Tuition Postponement Option 4, Feb.
10, 1971 (mimeo.).
35. Contract §§ 9.02-.03.
36. Estimates are made by the University using an expected average CIR of seven
per cent. See note 83 infra.
37. Yale Daily News, supra note 1, at 2, col. 5.
38. The letter was written Aug. 2, 1971. YALE UNIVERSITY, TiE REt',r o., 'Tim
PRESIDENT: 1970-71, at 12 n.1l (1971).
39. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13. The ruling precisely describes the Yale plan. As
to the effect of such rulings a Revenue Ruling is an "official interpretation" of the
tax code published for "information and guidance" of interested persons. Rev. Proc. 72.1,
1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, § 2.01, at 4. Published Rulings do not have the force of
Regulations but "provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and
may be cited and relied upon for that purpose." Id. § 6.01(f).
40. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 11.
41. Id. The usual allocation of each payment on a loan is first to accrued Interest,
with any remainder reducing the principal amount outstanding. However, parties to
a loan transaction are free to allocate payments between principal and interest in any
way they desire. The precedents are reviewed in Rev. Rul. 57, 1963-1 Cus. BULL. 103,
which holds that a small loan company may allocate all payments to principal until It
is entirely repaid.
42. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 11-12.
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This Note questions only the fourth and fifth decisions in the Rul-
ing. The fourth holds that, "the amounts paid by each participant in
excess of the amount allocated to principal and insurance premiums
is interest and deductible under the provisions of section 163(a) of
the Code. '4 3 The Ruling cites precedent to the effect that interest
is simply "the amount one has contracted to pay for the use of bor-
rowed money, and as the compensation paid for the use or forbearance
of money," 44 and that interest need not be calculated as a percentage
of principal, so long as it is "a sum definitely ascertainable.""4 No
distinction is drawn between payments made before the participant
has repaid the amount of his own loan at the CIR and those made af-
ter that time, which are described above as the high-income "penalty." 40
Finally, the Ruling holds that a participant who repays less than
the amount of his own loan at the CIR does not receive taxable income
in the amount of his deficiency at Group Termination. The rationale
given is that,
each participant has an individual obligation to pay tie university
his deferred amount. However, no participant has a fixed obli-
gation to pay the university interest on such deferred amount...T
[emphasis added].
The implication is that since there is thus no obligation, tax prin-
ciples concerning forgiveness of indebtedness or its payment by an-
other are inapplicable.4 8
III. Evaluation of the Revenue Ruling
The Revenue Ruling applies to TPO principles which were de-
veloped in the context of individual loan transactions. In this section
it will be argued that TPO is sufficiently distinguishable from such
transactions to require a more fundamental analysis of TPO than
that reflected in the Revenue Ruling.
Specifically, two alternate grounds will be proposed to challenge
the validity of part of the tax deduction granted by the Ruling. The
43. Id. at 12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 163(a):
There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within tie
taxable year on indebtedness.
44. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 11-12, citing Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940) and Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
45. Id., citing Kena, Inc. v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941).
46. See p. 1395 supra.
47. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 12.
48. These principles are discussed at pp. 1403-04 infra.
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first is that the penalty is not interest at all. And the second is that
even if the penalty is interest, it is not interest on the debt of the
borrower who pays it.
A. The Penalty Payment as Insurance Premium
The Ruling is correct in its assumption that a borrower and lender
are ordinarily free to establish their own loan provisions and that
interest need not be calculated as a percentage of principal. Payments
may be geared to factors unrelated to the amount of the loan, and
all resulting payments in excess of principal are deductible as "in-
terest." The only requirement is that the "interest" must be paid for
the use of borrowed funds. 49
Thus, in a case cited in the Ruling, payments made under an agree-
ment to return a given percentage of profits derived from the invest-
ment of borrowed funds were held to be interest.50 And payments
under an arrangement by which a man paid his wife 25 per cent of
the profits of his business in exchange for a loan were deductible as
interest, notwithstanding the fact that each annual payment approached
or exceeded the principal amount."'
The Yale TPO Plan computes repayment by a variety of devices.
The size of each payment is proportional to income and the amount
borrowed; the maximum total repayment is a function of the amount
borrowed and a CIR; and the maximum repayment term is a specified
number of years. All of these features are consistent with treating
the penalty payments as interest.
But one other feature of the Yale Plan raises substantial questions
about the characterization of penalty payments as interest. This is
the variable Group Termination date, the date when the aggregate
indebtedness of the entire Repayment Group is discharged. 2 The
effect of this feature is that each borrower's obligation is partially
determined by the payments of others, and thus ultimately (given
the relationship of payments to income) by the size of his income
relative to the average income of the Group.53
49. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
50. Kena, Inc. v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941).
51. Dorzbach v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952).
52. See pp. 1396-97 supra.
53. A borrower with average income for his Group has just repaid the amount of
his own loan at the CIR when Group Termination occurs.
In computing the group average (mean), several adjustments must be made. Fihst,
because of the minimum payment, all incomes below $7250 must be treated as being
$7250. Second, because of Early Termination, all incomes above 150 per cent of the
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Despite the form of the contract, which gives the appearance that
the borrower makes payments solely in consideration of his own debt,
it is questionable whether penalty payments necessitated by this last
feature qualify as interest: i.e., that they are paid for the use of money.54
It seems more accurate to view these payments as made in exchange
for the assumption by the entire Repayment Group of the risk that
some borrowers will have incomes below the group average-providing,
in effect, a form of income insurance.ss
The Yale literature on the plan in fact comments on this "income
insurance" feature, assuming that it is one of the scheme's major at-
tractions0, And indeed, this feature does exhibit the two fundamental
characteristics of insurance, risk shifting and distribution. 7 The risk
relative to the repayment of the loan of having an income below group
average is shifted from the borrower. Such a shift would also occur
if repayment were geared to income for a set term of years. In that
case, the risk of a borrower's low income would be shifted to the
lender.58 But the Yale Plan takes the further step of distributing that
average must be treated as being 150 per cent of the average. The entire calculation
is thus one of successive approximation. Finally, incomes must be weighted by the
amounts borrowed.
54. The characterization of a transaction by the parties is not conclusive of its ax
consequences. It is the duty of the Commissioner and the courts to look through the
form of a transaction to determine its substance. See Deputy v. duPont, 303 U.S. 488,
497 (1940), in which no interest deduction was allowed because the "obligation" in-
volved did not meet the statutory criteria of "indebtedness." A pa)ment cannot be
characterized as interest if it is not "for the use of money." Lloyd v. Comnn'r, 15-1 F.2d
643 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 829 U.S. 717 (1946).
55. The IRS has consistently held that premiums paid for income maintenance are
not deductible under § 162 or, apparently, under § 212 of the tax code. Rev. Rul. 5,
1959-1 Cu.t. BuLL. 12; Rev. Rul. 383, 1957-2 Cus.% ButL. 4-1; I.T. 1918, 111- Cu.. BuLL.
121 (1924). See also Andrews v. Comm'r, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 93 (1970 No. 32). Fur-
thermore, seen as insurance TPO involves a double deduction. since payments are
deductible and receipts are nontaxable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(e) (1972); Rev. Rul.
383 supra. The same asymmetry results from an "interest" characterization. See p. 1405
infra.
56. Tobin & Pugash, supra note 34, at 2.
57. See Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
58. The same risk shifting from borrower to lender occurs even in the typical loan
case. A lender increases the interest rate he charges the individual borrower in light
of the certainty that some borrowers will default. The lender hinself bears the con.
sequences in terms of his own overall rate of return if his estimate of defaults is too
high or too low. Borrowers who do not default end up pa)ing a greater interest rate
than the average for borrowers as a whole, yet can clearly deduct the entire amount
paid as interest.
Insurance schemes have quite different risk-bearing consequences. Considering all the
risks involved in collecting on a loan, a lender may decide that he does not wish to
bear the risk of defaults arising from the deaths of borrowers. Rather than increasing
the interest rate to all borrowers in the hope that the resulting extra income will
cover such defaults, he will charge all borrowers a lower interest rate, but also charge
an insurance premium to purchase term insurance on their lives. The lender is then
indifferent as to the frequency of borrower deaths, since the insurance pays him the
outstanding indebtedness of deceased borrowers. The insurance company rather than
the lender bears the risk of variations from the expected norm. The insurance pre-
miums paid by the borrowers in such cases are not deductible. See note 55s supra.
The point of the discussion in the text is that the penalty paid by high income
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risk50 over the entire Repayment Group, by measuring the obligation
of each borrower by the payments made by all group members. Thus,
a portion of the payments made by high-income borrowers is for risk
distribution, not for the use of money, and should not qualify, for
tax purposes, as interest.
To identify that portion which should not qualify as interest, it is
necessary to begin with the Group Termination Account. As noted
above, that account is equal to total principal plus aggregated interest
minus payments by all group members.00 Despite disclaimers about
repayment obligation,0' it is clear that the portion of the initial bal-
ance of that account attributable to an individual borrower can be
easily calculated: it is the amount he individually borrowed plus in-
terest at the CIR from the date of the loan. 2 It is also clear that at
Group Termination, each individual amount of principal, with in-
terest at the contract rate, will have been paid in ful, either by the
individual borrower or by other members of his Group. The line that
emerges in dividing interest payments from those properly attributed
to risk distribution is the point at which an individual has repaid the
principal he borrowed plus interest at the contract rate.
It should not be objected that these "insurance premiums" are
paid by only a portion of the Group, or that they are made late rather
than early. 63 Risk shifting and distributing devices need not conform
borrowers under TPO is considerably more like the second situation than the first. The
university is indifferent as to whether any particular borrowers (and up to a point
whether borrowers as a whole) have incomes above or below predicted incomes. Varia.
tions from expectations will affect the time of Group Termination, but whenever It
does occur the university will have achieved its desired rate of return, Le., the CIR.
For the necessary qualification to this point in light of the possibility that Group
Termination may not occur within thirty-five years, see note 59 infra.
59. The risk that Group Termination will not occur within 35 years will not
be distributed over the Group, but will be directly borne by Yale. But all lenders
may choose to bear some risks themselves, while avoiding other risks by charging bor.
rowers insurance premiums. The fact, for example, that a lender charges extra interest
for his risk of defaults for reasons other than death, does not affect the nondeductibility
of the insurance premium he charges for the risk of defaults from deaths of borrowers.
In fact, Yale is not charging any fee for the risk it is bearing that Group Termlinationt
will not occur within 35 years. Such a fee, if included in the calculation of the Cilt,
would be deductible as interest by all borrowers under the analysis put forth.
The actual risk to Yale is quite small. For example, the iPlan has leeway for Incomes
in constant dollars to average 30 per cent below expectations. Tobin & i'ugash, supra
note 34, at 4. Group Termination was initially expected to occur within 26-28 )ears,
id., but is now expected within 26 years. Yale Daily News, Mar. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
60. See p. 1397 supra.
61. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 39, at 12. See p. 1399 supra.
62. See p. 1397 supra.
63. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 853 (1950); Estate of Moyer v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 515 (1959). These cases char.
acterized the payment of member death benefits by stock exchange organizations as
insurance. The benefits were financed through initiation fees and through assessments
levied upon surviving members at the time of a death.
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to the forms typical of the insurance industry. The mechanics of risk
distribution can be expected to vary according to the risk involved.
For those which produce loss that requires immediate lump-sum com-
pensation, the device of the insurance premium to spread losses over
time is desirable. And payment of premiums in advance creates a
reservoir of funds that can be used when a loss occurs. Everyone who
is insured pays the premium because those who will be injured are
not identifiable at the time the fund must be created.
By contrast, there is no need for traditional premiums in the TPO
Plan. The risk involved, a low income, is not a casualty risk, and its
occurrence does not require an immediate, large payment. There is
thus no need for advance pooling of funds. Spreading the loss over
time is accomplished through continued payments by those who have
not experienced the low income (against which they are insured), in
proportion to the degree to which they have avoided that risk. In
short, the mechanics of risk distribution in the Yale Plan appear well
suited to the risk involved. 4
The conclusion from this discussion is that all payments made by
a borrower after he has paid enough to discharge his "personal" por-
tion of the Group Termination Account, are payments made pur-
suant to a risk-sharing agreement. They are not paid for the use of
money, and therefore despite the Revenue Ruling, should not be
deductible as interest.
B. The Penalty Payment as Non-Deductible Interest
In order to qualify for an interest deduction, a taxpayer must be
indebted and have an obligation to pay interest."a When such interest
is paid by another or forgiven, the taxpayer is not ordinarily entitled
to take the deduction.6 However, if the taxpayer must include the
amount so paid or forgiven as income 7 then he may deduct that
amount as interest expense.0 8 The net result, for a taxpayer who
itemizes deductions, is that the income and the deduction cancel one
64. This arrangement is not unlike early mutual insurance societies in Flandcrs, the
membcrs of which assessed themselves to indemnify a fellow member who suffered
misfortune. See C. TREaERRY, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HisroRy OF INSUJRANCE 251-59 (1926).
65. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 163(a). See, e.g., Chicago N. Shore & Milwaukce R.R.
Co. v. Comm'r, 326 F.2d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 377 U.S. 961 (1964); D.
Loveman & Sons Export Corp. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 776 (1960), afJ'd, 290 F.2d 732 (6th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962).
66. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Conm'r, 53 T.C. 275 (1969).
67. The general principle is that "[t]he discharge by a third person of an obligation
. . is equivalent to receipt by the person [who was obligated]." Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929).
68. Cooledge v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1325, 1328 (1939). See also note 69 infra.
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another. If neither income nor deduction is reported, the taxpayer
still receives an implicit interest deduction. 0 The person who ac-
tually pays the taxpayer's interest in this situation is not entitled
to a deduction, since the interest is not paid on his debt.70 If he were
allowed a deduction, the interest would be deducted twice, once by
the indebted taxpayer and once by the person who paid it.71
As noted above, the Ruling held that
each participant has an individual obligation to pay the university
his deferred amount. However, no participant has a fixed obli-
gation to pay the university interest on such deferred amount
.. 72 [emphasis added].
So long as the individual makes his required payments, no payment
made by any other participant is deemed to be interest on that indi-
vidual's loan, and is not, therefore, taxable income to him. Similarly,
the deductibility as interest of all payments made in excess of principal
by any individual participant presents no difficulty under the rationale
of the Ruling, as each individual is obligated to pay as much interest
as the payment formula happens to, produce. He is thus obligated to
pay interest on indebtedness; he does so, and is entitled to a deduction.
No double interest deduction arises under this analysis because every-
thing a borrower pays is deemed to be on his own debt.
But the Ruling's analysis, developed in the context of an individual
debt, fails in the unique situation created by a variable term con-
tingent repayment plan. In the individual loan situation, the stated
interest rate represents the total return to the lender from the money
loaned to a particular borrower. Even where payments are calculated
according to a percentage of profits73 the size of the payments still
69. Cf. Dean v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (interest free loan from corporation to
sole owner, not taxable income to owner because interest would be deductible anyway).
Most caseg requiring that forgiven interest be recorded as income are based on the
need to offset an earlier interest deduction taken by an accrual basis taxpayer when his
interest obligation is later forgiven. See, e.g., Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.*d
933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940). Such cancellation of a prior explicit
deduction leaves intact the implicit interest deduction suggested in the text.
70. In Simon v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 184 (1937), it is held that
the principal indebtedness on the note was solely that of (another], and the interest
which petitioner undertook to pay was not interest on his indebtedness, and prop.
erly speaking may not as to him be called interest at all.
Id. at 185-86. No deduction is allowed even where such payments are required by
contract. Eskimo Pie Corp., 4 T.C. 669 (1945), aff'd, 153 F.2d 301 (3d Cir, 1946).
71. Such duplication of the interest deduction would be against the policy of the
tax code. See Cooledge v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1325, 1328 (1939). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.161.1(1958): "Double deductions are not permitted." But see World Publishing Co. v., Coinn'r,
299 F.2d 614, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1962).
72. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 12.
73. See p. 1400 supra.
1404
Vol. 81: 1392, 1972
A Tax Shelter for Students
determines the lender's return on that principal. By contrast, in a
variable term contingent repayment situation, the payments made by
each borrower do not determine the rate of return to the lender from
the individual loan. Rather, that return is calculated by application
of a given interest rate to the principal borrowed 4 The contingent
payments made by each borrower, far from defining the return that
the lender will realize, are merely applied against a predetermined
return. And if the payments made by one participant are not enough
to discharge his principal plus the stated interest rate, someone else is
required to pay the deficiency. Therefore, the simple fact that no
participant has a "fixed obligation to pay the university interest!".
seems unpersuasive in the present absence of the implicit second con-
dition, namely that the university is not guaranteed any given return
on the money it has loaned any given participant.
Variable term, quasi-group debts thus are not necessarily amenable
to analysis developed for individual debts. In particular, it is necessary
under the Yale Plan to determine not merely the amount each indi-
vidual pays, but also the source of the obligation which his payment
discharges. Once he has paid enough to discharge the obligation gen-
erated by his principal, further payments are against interest generated
by the debts of others. Those others receive an implicit interest de-
duction, as they do not report as income the difference between the
interest actually generated by their principal and the amount they pay.
Thus deduction of such amounts by the persons making the payments
is in effect a double deduction of that interest, impermissible under
the principles noted above.
IV. The Interest Deduction as a Subsidy to Education:
Policy Considerations
The ideal device to achieve equal educational opportunity would
be one which precisely identified a student's ability, both present
and future, to pay for educational services, and then supplied the
deficiency-tailoring financial assistance to the need of the student.
This could involve the state's paying tuition or living expenses, or,
conceivably, providing support for persons dependent on the prospec-
tive student.
Even in a world of ample public resources, the calculation of a
74. See p. 1397 supra.
75. Rev. Rul. 72-2, supra note 13, at 12. See p. 1404 supra.
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student's ability to pay should include the amount he could be ex-
pected to borrow. But in the world of limited public funds, educa-
tional loans must be the primary vehicle for pursuing equal educational
opportunity." It is critically important, then, to construct a loan
system that will: (1) maximize the amount students can borrow, (2)
encourage students to borrow that maximum, if necessary to finance
their education, and (3) do this by the most efficient use of the
limited government subsidy.
In the remainder of this Note it is argued that by such criteria a
contingent repayment system is superior to conventional education
loans. However, it will be suggested that the Revenue Ruling may
foreclose desirable experimentation to determine the most efficient
use of government subsidies in such plans.
The necessity of repayment within a comparatively short term im-
poses an upper limit on the amount of conventional educational debt
a student can bear. Moreover, since the repayment years normally
coincide with a former student's years of lowest income, the maximum
sustainable payments (and thus, the maximum feasible loan) are
held at relatively low levels.7r Finally, the fixed payments required
by conventional loans, coupled with students' inevitable uncertainty
about their future incomes, 78 will tend to decrease their willingness
to borrow. The specter of high fixed payments along with the pos-
sibility of relatively low income seems unlikely to encourage borrow-
ing at the optimal level.79
Contingent repayment plans tie repayment to income rather than
to the amount borrowed and extend payments over a longer term,
producing two benefits. First, they increase the amount of educational
debt that a student is able to discharge. The extended term makes
repayment less burdensome. And since payments are concentrated
in the latter portion of the borrower's earning career, the limitation
76. The cost of even a modest grant program to institutions, which would provide
them up to $1000 per needy student would be about $5 billion per year. 1970 Education
Hearings, supra note 2, at 553-54. This should be compared with the $100 million that
the government is likely to spend this year for institutional grants. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1972, at 45, col. 7. See note 7 supra.
77. Long term conventional loans are, of course, possible, and would somewhat reduce
the urgency of this objection. But even a 30-year conventional loan with interest at
seven per cent subsidized during four years of college would require annual payments
of $85 per year per $1000 borrowed. Under TPO, such payments would not be required
until income rose above $20,000.
78. This uncertainty is well-founded, given the large variation of income among
college graduates. Some 20 to 35 per cent of the graduates will have incomes below
the average for all income earners in their region. 1970 Education Hearings, supra note
2, pt. 1, at 444.
79. See Daniere, The Benefits and Costs of Alternative Federal Programs of Financial
Aid to College Students, in ECONOMICS COMPENDIUM, supra note 4, at 556, 576.81.
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imposed by initially low income is removed. Second, they should
increase the amount a student is willing to borrow. As payments are
determined by income, the chance of having a low income should no
longer be a deterrent to borrowing. To the extent that a student
bases borrowing decisions on a cost-benefit analysis, contingent re-
payment plans should further encourage a willingness to borrow by
directly relating the cost of the loan to his overall economic benefit
from the education purchased, thus reducing the risk that educational
costs will exceed benefits.
One possible drawback of contingent repayment plans-among those
most feared-is that only those expecting low incomes will participate
and that the sponsor of the plan will have to absorb considerable
losses as a result. Concern about this possibility is acutely evident even
when the federal government is asked to participate.80 Limited federal
funds would quickly be exhausted unless the deficit created by low-
income borrowers is offset by a surplus generated by those with high
incomes.
But this fear of "adverse selection" may be groundless. It is by no
means clear that many students are so certain of having high incomes
that they will not insure against the possibility of a low one through
participation in the plan. Even if there are many students so optimistic,
it is far from certain that they will ultimately have the high incomes.
Unfortunately, as a result of the Revenue Ruling, it will be more
difficult to discover whether the adverse selection danger really exists:
the Ruling grants a tax deduction that may not, in fact, be necessary
to induce high-income expectants to participate in contingent repay-
ment plans. The experimental opportunity thus foreclosed by the
Ruling becomes clear when one considers the subsidy implications of
other possible contingent repayment arrangements. 8'
80. See note 2 supra.
81. Contingent repayment plans of other universities differ from Yale's TPO in a
number of respects. None of these other plans requires borrowers with high incomes
to repay more than they would have to pay at commercial loan rates; i.e., all arc sub-
sidized. See pp. 1394-95 supra.
The comparison with the Duke University plan, in effect in 1971-72, is particularly
striking. See Duke University, Duke University Deferred Tuition Plan, May 31. 1971.
First, undergraduate borrowers must repay .36 per cent of their adjusted gross income
per $1000 borrowed for a ffxed thirty )ears, with a minimum repayment similar to
Yale's. Id. §§ IV A, V, app. A. There is thus no concept of Group Termination. Stu-
dents pay ten per cent less each year than under the Yale Plan. They give up the
chance to stop paying within thirty 1years even if they have relatively low incomes, a
possibility under the Yale Plan occurring if Group Termination occurs withil 30
years. Likewise, Duke borrowers need not worry about Group Tennination not occurring
within 30 years.
Second, borrowers in different schools of Duke repay at different rates. For example.
law students have among their options the choices of paying .40 per cent for twenty
years, or .72 per cent for ten years. Id. app. B. Medical students may choose .36 per
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There are a number of ways to make a tuition postponement plan
largely self-supporting. If the plan is designed with a fixed termination
date, the designers must project the average income level of the par-
ticipants and impose a repayment rate which will cause the aggregate
debt to be redeemed by the termination date. If it is essential that
the plan be self-supporting, there is considerable pressure on the
designers to build in comfortable margins in the repayment rate or
period, or both, to insure that the plan will not lose money. This
problem is particularly acute during the initial period of operation.
The difficulty is that such margins simultaneously decrease the utility
of the plan to those expecting or fearing low incomes and reduce
its attractiveness to those who anticipate relatively high ones. Such ac-
tions may cause adverse selection to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.82
cent for ten years or .75 per cent for five years. Id. app. C. It is clear that medical stu.
dents are most favored, law students are in the middle, and undergraduates are least
favored, as compared with the Yale Plan.
Third, regardless of his income no Duke borrower pays more than the equivalent of
repaying his original loan at a fixed interest rate of eight per cent. Reaching that
level-by annual payments or by buying out-ends all further obligation. Id. § IX. No
borrower tinder the Duke plan, therefore, pays more than does the average borrower
under the Yale Plan. Duke simply bears the cost itself, rather than placing the burden
on borrowers with high incomes.
Harvard University is taking still another approach with a plan beginning this year,
Harvard University Student Loan Office, Background and Basis of the new Harvard
Loan Program, undated (mimeo.). Student loans will be made so as to meet the require-
ments for the federal guarantee against defaults and the federal interest subsidy. Id.
at 1. No borrower can be required to pay more than a seven per cent interest rate,
maximum term is ten years, and annual payments must total ,360. But there is no
federal requirement that the loan repayment schedule consist of level payments: Harvard's
minimum repayment schedule for a total loan obligation of $,1000 (the normal under.
graduate maximum) will require payments of $360 the first year, gradually rising to
$828 in the tenth and final year. Id. at 3.
No Harvard borrower will be required in any year to make payments in an autount
greater than six per cent of his income for that year regardless of the amount borrowed.
If the repayment schedule would require such payments in a given year, Harvard will
offer to substitute its own one-year renewable notes (at seven per cent interest) for tile
excess amount over six per cent of income (as if the student had borrowed money
from an outside source to repay his federal guaranteed loan). In any year when Harvard's
own notes are outstanding, the borrower must pay the full six per cent of Income,
payments going first to meet the federal loan obligation as far as possible, and any
excess going to meet the Harvard obligation. At the end of ten years, no federal loan
obligation will be outstanding, but the borrower might have Harvard notes outstanding,
Borrowers with outstanding notes must pay six per cent of income for at most three
years, or until the notes are fully paid. If notes are still outstanding after three )ears
(13 years after repayments began), Harvard will offer to forgive the balance, at its own
expense. Id. at 4-5.
Similar to the Harvard system is the loan plan recently enacted in New York State,
expected to begin operation in September 1973. Any student attending a New York
institution will be able to borrow tip to $2500 per academic year directly from his own
college. The state mortgage agency will immediately buy the note at full value front
the college, and the student will make payments during the ten-year repayment period
directly to the state. The interest rate will not exceed seven per cent, and students
with low incomes could have repayments suspended. Act of May 8, 1972, ch. 234, [1972]
N.Y. Session Laws.
82. Overall future income levels of borrowers are a significant factor in determinIng
the repayment terms that are required, despite calculations to the contrary in Shell,
Notes on the Educational Opportunity Bank, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 214 (1970). For example,
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By contrast, a plan becomes much more precise if it incorporates,
as does the Yale Plan, a variable payment term. In this case, the pre-
cision of initial projections is less critical, because errors are correct-
ed automatically by the variable termination date. There is no need
to increase the repayment rate to hedge against unexpected adverse
selection. As a result, the rate stays lower, making it less likely adverse
selection will in fact occur. At the same time it produces a plan more
useful to those who expect low incomes.
The variable term plan also seems to be more efficient from the
standpoint of subsidies to education. In a fixed-term plan, an interest
deduction must be granted for all payments beyond principal, under
the general tax rules discussed above. This subsidy is locked into
such a plan regardless of its effectiveness in promoting equal access
to education. In the case of variable term plans, as has been argued,
no interest deduction should be given for the high-income "penalty"
payments. This would allow the government to tailor its subsidies to
most efficiently promote educational equality. s3 Such a plan should
be operated, at least initially, without a tax subsidy, in order to de-
termine the truth of the theory of adverse selection. For the reasons
given above,8 4 and because an interest deduction is valid for payments
made prior to the penalty, contingent repayment plans of this type
may not need an additional tax subsidy to attract high-income bor-
rowers. If that is the case, the interest deduction granted by the Rev-
enue Ruling, when considered as a subsidy to promote access to edu-
cation, is essentially wasted.
a 30 per cent underestimate of incomes of TPO borrowers (the same percentage in
effect used by Shell) would delay Group Termination by as much as eight )eas. See
note 59 supra. Note that the Duke plan requires significantly different repa)ment rates
from student groups with differing income expectations. See note 81 supra.
83. To understand the magnitude of the subsidy involved in allowing deduction
of the penalty, consider the following example provided by Yale University, The Yale
Tuition Postponement Option 1972-73, undated. This example postulates a freshman
participant whose income (projected as the seventieth percentile) rises through the
range of $10,000-$54,000, in constant 1972 dollars. A CIR of seven per cent is assumed.
For each $100 he borrows he will repay $597 by the time he reaches Earl) Termination
after 24 years. The $497 representing "interest" will produce a tax saving of 200.
It is necessary to go beyond the Yale figures to determine how much of that tax
saving is attributable to deduction of penalty payments. The following figures result.
Amount of Tax
"Interest" Paid Savings
Payments on "own debt" $197 $ 68
"Penalty" after repaying "own debt" $300 $132
These savings on the penalty deductions, when discounted at an estimated CIR of
seven per cent, yield a present value of about $23. for each $100 borrowed. This is
roughly equivalent to the subsidy granted to students under the Federal Guaranteed
Loan Program. See note 5 supra. The size of the subsidy will vary fron person to
person, but everyone above the fiftieth percentile will receive some subsidy.
84. See pp. 1406-07 supra.
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Should experimentation indicate that adverse selection is a seri-
ous danger, a deliberate decision could be made to subsidize the
plan in the most efficient manner. Depending on the degree of adverse
selection and the experimentally determined success of tax incentives
in attracting high-income borrowers, direct absorption of the net losses
of such plans may well provide more assistance to low-income student
borrowers than the tax deduction will prove an incentive to high-
income participation. Or the experiments might indicate that some
entirely different form of subsidy is most beneficial.
Whatever the result, the subsidy would then have been chosen for
its effectiveness, not haphazardly bestowed by the tax authorities. But
the Ruling unfortunately appears to have foreclosed the possibility
of desirable experimentation in this area by eliminating the possibility
of nondeductible penalties.
IV. Conclusion
It is doubtful under the Internal Revenue Code whether all non-
principal payments made under certain contingent repayment plans
should be deductible. A critical reexamination of the merits of the
relevant Revenue Ruling should be undertaken. Congress, in any
event, should not permit this Ruling-or any other-to foreclose ex-
perimentation as to the most efficient means of subsidizing contingent
repayment plans. Equal educational opportunity is a goal well worth
the cost of experimentation. As a means to that goal, contingent re-
payment plans are well worth pursuing.
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